Is Belgium the Next Arctic State?

With a population of just over 11 million, a coastline totalling 70 kilometres and a size so small that it is often used as a unit of comparison for other geographical areas, Belgium may not seem like a typical Arctic state—to borrow the famous term coined in China’s 2018 Arctic policy. Yet there is now to be a Belgian Arctic strategy, advanced by policymakers in Brussels. The question is whether this reorientation towards the North Pole should be regarded as a conventional Arctic policy, or rather as a prerogative of the European Union.

To understand why the Arctic has not been a focus of Belgian foreign policy, we need to turn the clock back a little. Belgian and Antarctic historians like to point out that Belgium organised the first Antarctic overwintering expedition. Led by Baron Adrien de Gerlache, a naval officer from Hasselt, aboard the RV Belgica, the Belgian Antarctic Expedition of 1897–1899 is often regarded as the first expedition of the Heroic Age of Antarctic Exploration. Among its crew was a 25-year-old unpaid Norwegian first officer, Roald Amundsen, who would become one of the most famous polar explorers. Belgian interests in Antarctica did not end there; they continued. To experts in Antarctic law, the idea that Belgium is not a polar nation may sound absurd. Although Belgium makes no territorial claim to the seventh continent, it is among the Antarctic Treaty’s twelve original signatories.

Within the Antarctic Treaty System, states’ interest in science is one of the main pillars of Antarctic administration and cooperation. During the International Geophysical Year in 1958, Belgium established Roi Baudouin Base, its first scientific research station in Antarctica, on a floating ice shelf off the coast of Dronning Maud Land. The station was later closed in 1967. In the late 1970s, the Belgian government decided to build a research vessel for Belgian marine research. The new RV A692 Belgica, named after its nineteenth-century counterpart, entered service in 1984.

In the 2000s, Belgium organised several scientific expeditions, known as BELARE, through the Belgian Science Policy Office (BELSPO) and the International Polar Foundation (IPF), led by polar explorer Alain Hubert. By building the Princess Elisabeth research station in 2009, the IPF marked Belgium’s full return as a scientific actor in Antarctica. Named after the eldest daughter of Belgium’s King Philippe, the station is Antarctica’s only zero-emission research station. Powered by solar and wind energy, it hosts scientists from around the world each research season. After almost 36 years of oceanographic research, the Council of Ministers decided to retire RV A692 Belgica and acquire a new research vessel. The new vessel is called RV Belgica II and is owned by the Belgian government through BELSPO.

On 13 September 2021, Belgium signed an agreement with Ukraine to transfer RV Belgica to the Ukrainian authorities under the European Union’s project to improve environmental monitoring in the Black Sea, EU4EMBLAS. The former Belgian polar vessel is therefore now in Odesa and will be used for scientific research in the Black Sea.

With such extensive Antarctic expertise, it is easy to wonder why Belgium has not shown more willingness to participate actively in Arctic politics. Belgium appears an obvious stakeholder in the European Arctic. Internationally, Brussels has long seen itself as a promoter of the rule of law. With regard to the Arctic, Belgium joined the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and participates in UN negotiations on an internationally legally binding instrument under UNCLOS concerning biodiversity beyond national jurisdiction. Among other things, this will codify states’ future conduct in the central Arctic Ocean. Although not directly involved in Indigenous-rights issues, Belgium voted for the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in 2007.

As other non-Arctic states have shown, scientific expertise from the southern polar regions can be transferred north with appropriate sensitivity to the Arctic’s social, environmental, cultural and legal fabric. So far, Belgium has not followed many of its European counterparts in seeking observer status at the Arctic Council. In a world where strategic positioning is key to being seen as an honest Arctic actor—that is, a non-Arctic actor with a deep understanding of Arctic affairs—Belgium has yet to develop a comprehensive Arctic memorandum outlining potential Belgian interests. In recent years, however, some domestic political developments have attracted the attention of Arctic experts in Belgium.

Since 2013, a cross-party group of Belgian senators led by Senator and former Flemish government minister Bert Anciaux (SLP) has repeatedly presented a draft resolution on protecting and preserving the Arctic region. The original draft paints a broad picture of Arctic affairs, environmental challenges, potential economic activities, governance issues and the region’s potential for conflict. Although it mentions Indigenous Peoples and Arctic residents, it focuses more on the geopolitical consequences of Arctic change. Among other things, it calls on Belgium to play a larger role in developing a common European Union Arctic policy, to encourage the EU to continue seeking Arctic observer status, and to remain engaged in the Arctic through multilateral frameworks such as the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and NATO.

Interestingly, the latest version of the draft resolution, for 2019, called on Belgium to advocate within the EU for an international moratorium on the exploitation of Arctic mineral resources. To attentive observers of EU Arctic affairs, this controversial moratorium may sound very familiar.

The EU’s Arctic engagement has decisively shaped the Belgian government’s position in recent years. Answering questions from members of the Chamber of Representatives’ Foreign Relations Committee in September 2020, then foreign minister Philippe Goffin (MR), for example, emphasised Belgium’s support for the 2016 integrated EU Arctic policy and the Council of the European Union’s 2019 conclusions.

Given the EU’s renewed and sustained Arctic interests, is it time for Belgium to expand its Arctic engagement?

In this respect, 2021 was a landmark year in Belgium’s journey towards the Arctic. At the legislative level, a cross-party group of members of parliament—Jasper Pillen (Open VLD), Marianne Verhaert (Open VLD), Kattrin Jadin (PFF) and Goedele Liekens (Open VLD)—submitted a new draft resolution calling on the Belgian government to pay more attention to security challenges associated with Arctic developments.

While the first half of the draft resolution focuses on geopolitical and security-policy questions, the second is more revealing about how Belgian politicians think about the Arctic. Acknowledging that the Arctic has had little influence on Belgium’s international actions, it highlights the strategic and geoeconomic implications of a warming Arctic. Zeebrugge, one of Belgium’s largest ports, has invested heavily in becoming the EU’s principal transshipment hub for Russian liquefied natural gas. New Arctic trade routes would hold potential for it as Arctic summer ice rapidly declines.

Although the Arctic remains a niche subject among foreign-policy officials and politicians in Brussels, it is gradually being discussed more often in parliamentary sessions and debates. Just recently, Michael Mann, the EU’s special envoy for Arctic matters, tweeted that he had attended a meeting of parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee to discuss recent Arctic developments.

Given its well-documented colonial past and its controversial legacy, Belgium must be careful about how it engages in the Arctic. Avoiding colonial rhetoric about the Arctic is essential if it is to act as an honest partner at the North Pole. At the same time, as climate change and the crisis of the Anthropocene affect how people and societies interact with the natural world—not only the Arctic—better-considered and stricter environmental measures are needed at home. If the old Arctic saying ‘What happens in the Arctic…’ is true, the reverse is also true: what happens in Belgium does not stay in Belgium. Amid the complexity of Belgium’s federal division of powers, this may require fostering greater cohesion between the regions and the federal government—a substantial task even for the most skilful politicians.

With Belgium’s wealth of scientific and diplomatic expertise in Antarctica, there is certainly room for stronger Arctic engagement, and willingness among the relevant public and private institutions.

Should Belgium apply to join the Arctic Council as an observer? Are there other ways to participate in Arctic governance? Lessons can be learned from non-Arctic states and non-state actors that have sought greater engagement in recent years. The EU’s continuing de facto observer status and the rejection of Estonia’s application in 2021 are reminders that participation in Arctic policymaking through the Arctic Council is no easy matter. To become honest Arctic actors, EU member states should develop long-term strategies seeking closer ties with the Arctic as a region, Arctic states, and local and Indigenous communities.

This could also mean bringing more of the Arctic to Belgium. An Arctic strategy takes shape over time and must be continually reaffirmed. States outside the region that wish to participate in all or some aspects of Arctic governance must decide what kinds of Arctic relationships they want to create. This interconnected network can range from bilateral cooperation with particular Arctic states and non-state partners, through investment of resources in multilateral forums, to promoting the rule of law and tackling climate change at home.

For Belgium, the question now is which areas of Arctic policy it wishes to invest in. Even a brief look at the list of contributors to the MOSAIC project shows that many Belgian or Belgium-based scientists and researchers are conducting or participating in Arctic-related projects.

The ‘Arcticisation’ of Belgian foreign policy and science diplomacy cannot, however, rely solely on motivated individuals. It requires coordinated action. Promoting international scientific cooperation through science diplomacy, investing in Arctic research in both the natural and social sciences, and increasing dialogue with Arctic residents would help make the most of domestic researchers’ and policymakers’ engagement.

What would be the next task on Belgium’s Arctic agenda? Perhaps the challenging undertaking of drafting a coherent Belgian Arctic strategy document that connects science and policy with a deep understanding of Arctic affairs and governance. But is there enough political will in Belgium?