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Denmark and Politics at the North Pole

Original title: Dänemark und die Politik am Nordpol

Denmark is often overlooked among the other Arctic Council members. In fact, Denmark has the largest polar territories of all Council members, and therefore the potential for greater influence.

Denmark and Politics at the North Pole — illustrative Arctic photograph
Photo: Buiobuione · CC BY-SA 4.0 ↗

The Danish government initiated the so-called Ilulissat Declaration, binding five major Arctic powers in an agreement on environmental protection, the administration of trade routes and maritime management. Recently, Denmark’s Ministry of Defence announced a plan to develop the Royal Danish Navy, and the US Air Force confirmed plans to support Thule Air Base through Danish-owned companies. Far from being an underestimated Arctic country, Denmark will play an increasingly important role in Arctic security and development over the next 12 months.

Greenland is unlikely to achieve full independence in the coming year. Greenlandic sovereignty would jeopardise Denmark’s status as an Arctic state and the owner of the largest Arctic territory. The United States has agreed to award Greenlandic companies maintenance contracts for the US air base at Thule. Greenland is crucial to Denmark’s claim to 350,000 square miles of continental shelf, submitted in 2014. The claim rests on the extension of the Lomonosov Ridge from Greenland’s mainland. Canada and Russia have also disputed this claim. The UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf is still evaluating the Danish submission.

Last year, however, Greenland’s foreign minister Pele Broberg was demoted over ethically contentious statements about the voting rights of non-Inuit residents. Broberg said that only ethnic Inuit could vote in an independence referendum. Meanwhile, Greenland’s economy depends heavily on annual grants from the Danish government.

Preliminary polls suggest a majority in favour of independence, but support falls when respondents are asked whether they would accept a lower standard of living as a result. The Danish government also wants to indicate, in a form yet to be determined, when it would end its annual grant to Greenland’s government. Chinese investment could potentially make up for the loss of the Danish grant. To make real progress towards independence, Greenland’s government would need to plan, finance and announce a referendum.

Denmark is very likely to invest heavily in its naval capabilities over the next 12 months. In August of this year, Denmark’s Ministry of Defence approved an investment of $5.5 billion in the Royal Danish Navy. Most of this investment will replace older vessels. Overall, Denmark has agreed to increase defence spending to as much as 2% of GDP. Terma, a Danish defence manufacturer, proposes building new patrol vessels as well as command-and-control and radar systems.

NATO maintains a multinational standing naval force. Denmark contributes at least one vessel to Group A of the standing naval forces. Denmark has long provided naval forces to the NATO Response Force. For example, the Royal Danish Navy’s Iver Huitfeldt-class frigate HDMS Niels Juel completed an exercise with US, British and German warships in the Arctic and the Baltic Sea. Despite retreating sea ice, the Arctic remains a dangerous area for shipping. For this reason, Canada’s National Research Council developed the Canadian Arctic Shipping Risk Assessment System (CASRAS).

Danish naval vessels have also played a significant part in testing CASRAS. Denmark is investing extensively in naval intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance systems and in beyond-line-of-sight communications for maritime facilities. These developments are intended to be integrated by all alliance members. Last month, a Royal Danish Navy Iver Huitfeldt-class frigate fired US-supplied SM-1 missiles, demonstrating its operational capability.

Awareness is growing of the need to protect offshore oil and gas fields and other economic assets. Denmark is conducting anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Guinea with a single frigate, HDMS Esbern Snare. In October, Esbern Snare thwarted an attack on a merchant vessel.

What is certain, however, is that Russian–Danish tensions in the Arctic will escalate over the next 12 months. After the United States and Norway signed the Supplementary Defence Cooperation Agreement, allowing US naval units to use Norwegian ports, Denmark sought a similar agreement. Denmark and Norway also recently signed a cooperation agreement. A Russian warship repeatedly entered Danish territorial waters in June 2022. Although Russia rejected the allegations, there is clear evidence that the vessel was Russian. The incident occurred on the same day that Ukraine’s military sank a Russian vessel in the Black Sea using Harpoon missiles. Ukraine had received Harpoon missiles from Denmark. Consequently, Russia placed Denmark on its list of ‘unfriendly nations’ because of Danish support for Ukraine. The day after the incident, false reports began circulating on Russian social media claiming that Denmark had opened fire on the Russian warship. At least four Russian naval vessels, including a submarine, passed through Danish territorial waters on their way to St Petersburg.

Denmark’s Arctic policy is supported by a strong Arctic military presence, particularly from the United States. Greenlandic independence would benefit Russian interests. The Kremlin could also support pro-independence parties. China and Russia want to exploit Greenland’s mineral resources and political independence—but is Greenland prepared to pay the price?

Originally published in German by der Freitag. Full English translation provided for Arctic Policy; the original text is reproduced with the author’s permission.Original source (German) ↗